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DEFENSE LAWYERS AS MEMBERSHIP BROKERS
STEPHEN LEE'
Twelve years ago, I enrolled in an immigration course as a 2L. I had
the good fortune to learn the material from someone who possessed as
much compassion for the nation's immigrant communities as he did ex-
pertise over the subject matter.' Years later, once I entered law teaching,
I began gathering my materials for an immigration course of my own. I
quickly learned that my old notes were useless. The subject of this sym-
posium explains why. The emergence of "crimmigration" as a body of
law-comprised mostly of cases, regulations, and administrative memo-
randa-has transformed the field of immigration law. Criminal law and
procedure is changing as well. This much became clear in 2010 when the
Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky,2 which held that a criminal
defense lawyer's failure to apprise her noncitizen defendant client of the
potential immigration consequences of a proposed plea deal could
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
For the uninitiated, Jose Padilla was a Honduran citizen who had
4
been living in the United States for more than forty years. He was
caught transporting a large amount of marijuana. Prosecutors offered
Padilla a plea deal for misdemeanor and paraphernalia possession counts
and felony marijuana trafficking.5 This deal included a ten-year sentence
in which only five years would be served.6 Padilla's lawyer assured him
he faced no adverse immigration consequences given the length of his
residence.7 This was bad advice. These convictions unambiguously trig-
gered the immigration code's deportation provisions.! Padilla pursued a
post conviction challenge arguing that his lawyer's conduct amounted to
a violation of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel.9 After losing and winning and losing in the state courts,'0 Pa-
dilla got the chance to present his case to the Supreme Court, where he
t Stephen Lee, Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law.
1. Lucas Guttentag, the founding director of the ACLU's national immigrants' rights project,
taught the course at UC Berkeley while I was a student. He is currently serving as senior counsel to
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.
2. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
3. Id. at 366.
4. Brief of Petitioner at 8, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-651).
5. See id. at 9.
6. Id.
7. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359 (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky.
2008).
8. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(B) (2013); 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B)(i).
9. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359.
10. See Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483, 485 (Ky. 2008).
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persuaded seven justices that he had a legitimate Sixth Amendment
claim." Every defense lawyer must now identify and communicate to her
noncitizen client potential immigration consequences, at least where such
consequences are clear.12
Padilla undeniably represents an important intervention,'3 but now
what? What does Padilla mean for immigration law's core goal of select-
ing new members? This brief essay highlights two conversations that
have unfolded in separate universes but that, if brought together, could
help start answering this question. The first involves legal scholars who
have developed a "consumer protection" account of Padilla and the pro-
vision of criminal defense services. These scholars frame the central reg-
ulatory challenge in terms of correcting information asymmetries and
vindicating informational rights. Noncitizen defendants, these scholars
argue, are entitled to immigration-related information as they advance
through the criminal justice system.14 These informational rights are
analogous to the kinds of rights consumers face in markets characterized
by information asymmetries.
The notion of criminal defense services as a form of consumer pro-
tection stems from the transactional nature of the criminal conviction-
generating process. The vast majority of convictions are not the result of
a trial with judicial and jury oversight, but rather, the result of a plea bar-
gain, which largely takes place between the prosecutor and the defense
attorney.'5 Plea bargains are like contracts, and of course, contracts are
the legal mechanism that attracts a significant amount of scrutiny under
consumer protection laws. Forum selection clauses, arbitration clauses,
false advertising, labeling requirements, negotiation defaults-these are
all laws that try to constrain the universe of contracts. And that's what
Padilla did. It effectively imposed a different set of plea bargaining rules
when noncitizen defendants were involved.
This view of criminal defense practice crystallizes the degree to
which noncitizen defendants simply cannot make informed decisions
about plea offers because of the information asymmetry pervading the
plea bargaining process. Jenny Roberts has characterized Padilla as es-
11. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.
12. Id. at 369.
13. Today, criminal courts, and especially state criminal courts, have emerged as key adjudi-
cative bodies for making membership decisions, a power that has traditionally belonged to immigra-
tion judges and other federal agency officials and the Executive more generally. While state courts
lack the formal authority to enter removal orders to make other immigration-related decisions, they
functionally possess the power to do so. See Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF.
L. REv. 553, 555 (2013).
14. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor
to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1120 (2011); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effec-
tively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95
IOWA L. REV. 119, 126-31 (2009).
15. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372.
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tablishing an "informational" right.16 This information must be material
to the defendant's decision-making process. And indeed, this resonates
with the Strickland inquiry itself.17 After all, establishing a claim for in-
effective assistance of counsel requires demonstrating prejudice, which is
simply another way of characterizing information as material to the deci-
sion-making process.
A core tenet of transparency and mandatory disclosure laws is that
firms, private entities, and other regulatory targets possess information
that affects consumers and is difficult or impossible for the public to ac-
cess.'8 In each of these cases, the regulatory disclosure policy operates by
forcing the party in the best position to provide (and oftentimes in sole
possession of) information to a consumer. 19 This characterization applies
to Padilla, but it explains other areas of criminal procedure as well. Con-
sider, for example, Brady v. Maryland,20 which established a rule requir-
ing prosecutors to turn over potentially exculpatory evidence to defend-
21 22ants, or Miranda v. Arizona, which established the widely familiar set
of warnings to arrestees about their constitutional rights pertaining to
arrest and interrogation.23 Prosecutors hold a monopoly over the power to
charge defendants with crimes, thus they are in the best position to iden-
24tify whether exculpatory evidence exists. Informational rights as they
operate in the context of police serve a slightly different function, though
they ultimately improve the decision-making process for would-be crim-
inal defendants as well. Miranda established a right to know about your
rights, and in that sense, members of the public could in theory learn
about their rights in the arrest and interrogation process.25 But encounter-
ing the police on the street or in one's car or in an interrogation room can
be intimidating. Miranda rights seek to reduce the coercive nature of
these situations thus reducing the likelihood that individuals will make
decisions based on fear.26 Taken together, Brady, Miranda, and now Pa-
dilla, all established rights entitling the targets of law enforcement to
know about their rights at critical junctures throughout the criminal jus-
tice process.
16. See Roberts, supra note 14, at 123.
17. In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court articulated a two-step inquiry for estab-
lishing an ineffective assistance of counsel: first that the defendant's lawyer failed to provide "coun-
sel" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, and second, that this failure prejudiced the out-
come. See 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also Cesar Cuauhtdmoc Garcia HernAndez, Strickland-Lite:
Padilla s Two-Tiered Duty for Noncitizens, 72 MARYLAND L. REV. 844 (2013).
18. See David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155, 156 (2006).
19. See id.
20. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
21. Id. at 87.
22. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
23. Id. at 444-45.
24. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 86-87.
25. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
26. Id. at 443.
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As a concept, then, criminal defense as consumer protection offers
descriptive clarity. It helps organize and make sense of a variety of crim-
inal procedural rights. And in many ways, viewing criminal defendants
as consumers has an empowering element. Providing noncitizen defend-
ants with the information they need-that is, information on the immi-
gration consequences of a proposed plea deal-allows those noncitizens
to choose their destinies for themselves. Of course, consumer realities are
much more complicated. The information a consumer receives can be
confusing and overwhelming. It is in this respect that he consumer pro-
tection framework resonates with an ongoing discussion among social
scientists on immigrant incorporation. Adequately protecting the interests
of consumers involves not only establishing a right to obtain certain in-
formation but also designing a legal system that pays attention to how
and by whom that information should be provided.27 In this vein, markets
characterized by information asymmetries often are characterized by
intermediaries or brokers providing the information consumers seek. And
indeed, much of what defense lawyers must do on behalf of noncitizen
defendants involves identifying, communicating, and manipulating sensi-
tive, immigration-related information.
Social scientists have long been interested in immigrant incorpora-
tion and the process by which immigrants integrate into their communi-
ties. In recent years, scholarly interest has intensified given the high
number of unauthorized immigrants residing in the United States and the
limited opportunities available to them for regularizing their status. This
group of scholars has been particularly interested in how immigrants'
tenuous and "liminal" status informs their strategies for securing an array
of protections, benefits, and services to which they are otherwise enti-
tled.2 8 An increasingly influential strand of this conversation has high-
lighted the degree to which immigrants must rely on brokers and inter-
27. The body of scholarship addressing consumer protection through information disclosure is
significant. For a cross-section of this scholarship, see Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty,
Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 45, 45-46 (2003). See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Work-
place Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 353-55 (2011); Samuel Issacharoff, Disclosure, Agents,
and Consumer Protection, 167 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 56, 58 (2011); Weil, supra
note 18, at 155-56.
28. See, e.g., Leisy J. Abrego & Sarah M. Lakhani, Incomplete Inclusion: Legal Violence and
Immigrants in Liminal Legal Statuses, 37 L. & POL'Y 265, 273-76 (2015); Shannon Gleeson, Bro-
kering Immigrant Worker Rights: An Examination of Local Immigration Control, Administrative
Capacity and Civil Society, 41 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 470, 471 (2015); Paul G. Lewis & S.
Karthick Ramakrishnan, Police Practices in Immigrant-Destination Cities: Political Control or
Bureaucratic Professionalism?, 42 URB. AFF. REV. 874, 874-75 (2007); Helen B. Marrow, Immi-
grant Bureaucratic Incorporation: The Dual Roles of Professional Missions and Government Poli-
cies, 74 Am. Soc. Rev. 756, 756-57 (2009); Cecilia Menjivar, Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and
Guatemalan Immigrants' Lives in the United States, Ill AM. J. SOC. 999, 1000 (2006). For a more
comprehensive overview, see Stephen Lee, Book Review, Growing Up Outside the Law, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 1405, 1407 (2015).
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mediaries to overcome significant linguistic, information, and economic
barriers.29
As used in this literature, brokers are understood to be institutions
and actors "possessing ties to businesses, nonprofits, and government
agencies rich in resources, which then provide.. .institutions' patrons
with access to these resources.',30 Brokers bring value to immigrants'
lives by shrinking the universe of services and putting those services in
reach. They bridge networks and provide access to services typically
available only to the mainstream. While brokers themselves may have
the capacity to assist noncitizens with their various needs, often a bro-
ker's value resides in its ability to connect noncitizens with other organi-
zations that can meet those needs more effectively and efficiently.3 1 So-
cial scientists have examined this phenomenon across a variety of con-
texts ranging from childcare centers that serve the poor,3 2 foreign consu-
lar offices that respond to their citizens in the United States,33 and child-
hood immigrant arrivals who mediate the needs of their parental counter-
parts. 34
This scholarship has generated important insights about how immi-
grants can engage in member-like activities despite their tenuous legal
status, but often times, it has proceeded from the assumption that mem-
bership status is something to be attained or earned. It has left largely
unexamined those instances when a noncitizen already possesses insider
status and must fight to maintain or preserve it. That is, it has sidelined
those instances when a noncitizen with some form of permanent status
encounters the criminal justice system and faces the distinct possibility
that a trapdoor may open dropping her into the removal pipeline.
Consumers rely on a variety of intermediaries to gather information.
In some instances, legislatures and agencies play the role of intermediary
by compelling information disclosure. In other instances, these public
entities apply a softer hand by inviting and encouraging regulated bodies
to make voluntary disclosures or to submit to third-party entities for cer-
29. See Marrow, supra note 28, at 756-57.
30. Mario Luis Small, Neighborhood Institutions as Resource Brokers: Childcare Centers,
Interorganizational Ties, and Resource Access Among the Poor, 53 SOC. PROBS. 274, 274 (2006).
This definition applies to institutional brokers. Another subject of this conversation has focused on
individual brokers such as children. See, e.g., Lucy Tse, Language Brokering Among Latino Adoles-
cents: Prevalence, Attitudes, and School Performance, 17 HISP. J. BEHAv. SC. 180 (1995).
31. See X6chitl Bada & Shannon Gleeson, A New Approach to Migrant Labor Rights En-
forcement: The Crisis of Undocumented Worker Abuse and Mexican Consular Advocacy in the
United States, 40 LAB. STUD. J. 32, 45 (2015).
32. See, e.g., Mario Luis Small, Erin M. Jacobs, & Rebekah Peeples Massengill, Why Organi-
zational Ties Matter for Neighborhood Effects: Resource Access through Childcare Centers, 87
Soc. FORCES 387 (2008).
33. See, e.g., Bada & Gleeson, supra note 31, at 32.
34. See, e.g., Abel Valenzuela, Jr., Gender Roles and Settlement Activities Among Children
and Their Immigrant Families, 42 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 720, 723-25 (1999).
35. See Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of Commu-
nity Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109, 109 (1997).
913
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tification. And in still other instances, private actors step into the gap to
gather and sort information.37 In a sense, these brokers help workers nav-
igate labor markets filled with precarious work and "bad jobs." 38 In Pa-
dilla, the Court harnessed the Sixth Amendment to force defense lawyers
to serve a similar function for noncitizens traveling through the criminal
justice system-that is, to protect them against "bad deals."
The intermediaries and brokering frameworks help explain post-
Padilla cases. Padilla reoriented defense lawyers to look for and identify
immigration-related information. A pair of subsequent plea bargaining
cases helped fill out the infrastructure in which defense lawyers could fill
the interstitial space connecting the criminal and immigration systems. In
Missouri v. Frye,39 the Court held that defense lawyers were required to
communicate proposed plea deals to their clients.4 0 This type of rule puts
pressure on defense lawyers to err on the side of communicating too
much rather than too little information. And in Lafler v. Cooper,4 1 the
Court held that one possible remedy for a defense lawyer's ineffective
assistance of counsel was for prosecutors to reoffer the initial plea deal.42
This kind of rule creates a remedy for noncitizen defendants who suffer
from ineffective assistance of counsel. Without this kind of remedy,
noncitizen defendants who prevail on a Padilla ineffective assistance of
counsel claim would presumably have to proceed to trial. And the inher-
ent uncertainty of trial would mean that a victory on a Padilla claim
would amount to no victory at all. Lafler provides a fix for this by allow-
ing noncitizens who are unhappy with their counsel's performance to
have a clear sense of the road not taken.
Having said all this, it's important to emphasize that the market for
immigration-savvy criminal defense services was not inevitable. Rather,
it is entirely the by-product of the expansion of the grounds for deporta-
tion and the near elimination of opportunity for equitable relief and mer-
cy in immigration proceedings. Prohibiting a service or product can have
the effect of opening up new, black markets.4 3 Immigration law has wit-
nessed this phenomenon through several changes of law. In 1986, Con-
gress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which
36. The organic food-labeling regime is a good example of this. See Julie Guthman, Back to
the Land: The Paradox of Organic Food Standards, 36 ENV'T & PLAN. 511, 511 (2004) ("The
cornerstone of organic regulatory convention is third-party certification, a way to verify that produc-
ers grow according to organic standards.").
37. The National Association of Law Placement is a good example. See Estlund, supra note
27, at 384-85. So is YELP. See Daniel E. Ho, Designing Information Disclosure, 38 ADMIN. & REG.
L.NEWS 13, 14 (2012).
38. See Bada & Gleeson, supra note 31, at 33.
39. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
40. Id. at 1409.
41. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
42. Id. at 1391.
43. David Michael Jaros, Perfecting Criminal Markets, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1947, 1948-49
(2012).
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conditioned access to work on immigration status-in broad brush
strokes, it effectively prohibited visa overstayers, undocumented immi-
grants, and many other temporary visa holders from obtaining work.""
IRCA simultaneously required employers to verify the work authoriza-
tion status of their employees.4 5 Of course, this did not actually exclude
these immigrants from the labor market. Today, eight million of the es-
timated twelve million unauthorized immigrants are in the workforce.46
What happened? IRCA created a black market for work authorization
documents-birth certificates, social security cards, and the like. Re-
stricting access to work created new, criminal opportunities for entrepre-
neurs.47 The market for criminal defense services might be thought of as
markets in this tradition.
Immigration law's member-selection process has been transformed
from the affirmative pursuit of citizenship to the defensive posture of
avoiding contact with the police. Naturalization ceremonies no longer
represent he iconic cultural moment of becoming an insider.48 In 2015, a
moment that better reflects member-selection realities would be plea
colloquies conducted by sentencing judge in state courts all around the
country.
44. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3,359.
45. Id. § 101, 100 Stat. at 3,361-63.
46. See Securing the Border: Defining the Current Population Living in the Shadows and
Addressing Future Flows: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (written testimony of Jeffrey S. Passel), available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/03/26/testimony-of-jeffrey-s-passel-unauthorized-immigrant-
population/.
47. Jaros, supra note 43, at 1958-59.
48. See Susan Bibler Coutin, Cultural Logics of Belonging and Movement: Transnationalism,
Naturalization, and U.S. Immigration Politics, 30 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 508, 514-19 (2003).
915

